{"id":48682,"date":"2022-05-07T05:01:39","date_gmt":"2022-05-06T22:01:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/deepquest.code511.com\/blog\/2022\/05\/trojan-cryptolocker-code-execution\/"},"modified":"2022-05-07T05:01:39","modified_gmt":"2022-05-06T22:01:39","slug":"trojan-cryptolocker-code-execution","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/deepquest.code511.com\/blog\/2022\/05\/trojan-cryptolocker-code-execution\/","title":{"rendered":"Trojan.CryptoLocker Code Execution"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Cryptolocker ransomware drops a PE file in the AppDataRoaming directory which then tries to load a DLL named &#8220;netapi32.dll&#8221;. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is &#8220;C:WindowsSystem32&#8221; and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware&#8217;s flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there&#8217;s nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Cryptolocker ransomware drops a PE file in the AppDataRoaming directory which then tries to load a DLL named &#8220;netapi32.dll&#8221;. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":439,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"","_seopress_titles_title":"","_seopress_titles_desc":"","_seopress_robots_index":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[43],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-48682","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-exploit"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p4bBYZ-cFc","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/deepquest.code511.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/48682","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/deepquest.code511.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/deepquest.code511.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/deepquest.code511.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/439"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/deepquest.code511.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=48682"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/deepquest.code511.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/48682\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/deepquest.code511.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=48682"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/deepquest.code511.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=48682"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/deepquest.code511.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=48682"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}