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Tags: defacementREvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is “C:WindowsSystem32” and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on […]
Cryptowall ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is “C:WindowsSystem32” and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on […]
ChatBot Application with a Suggestion Feature version 1.0 suffers from a remote blind SQL injection vulnerability.
LockerGoga ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named “wow64log.dll” in WindowsSystem32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. Four processes are created. For instance, there is “imtvknqq9737.exe” running under AppDataLocalTemp, the process name is “imtvknqq” plus an appended random number. Our exploit DLL will simply display a […]
Cerber ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is “C:WindowsSystem32” and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on […]
CTBLocker ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is “C:WindowsSystem32” and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on […]
Craft CMS version 3.7.36 suffers from a password reset poisoning vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker who knows valid email addresses or account names of Craft CMS backend users is able to manipulate the password reset functionality in a way that the registered users of the CMS receive password reset emails containing a malicious password reset link.