:: Deepquest ::

Manipulation technique found in the Diebold central tabulator — 1,000 of these systems are in place, and they count up to two million votes at a time.
By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set of votes is created. This set of votes can be changed, so that it no longer matches the correct votes. The voting system will then read the totals from the bogus vote set. It takes only seconds to change the votes, and to date not a single location in the U.S. has implemented security measures to fully mitigate the risks.

This program is not “stupidity” or sloppiness. It was designed and tested over a series of a dozen version adjustments.

If you are in a county that uses GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS 1.18.19, or GEMS 1.18.23, your secretary or state may not have told you about this. You’re the one who’ll be blamed if your election is tampered with.

[b]Findings[/b]: The GEMS central tabulator program is incorrectly designed and highly vulnerable to fraud. Election results can be changed in a matter of seconds. Part of the program we examined appears to be designed with election tampering in mind. We have also learned that election officials maintain inadequate controls over access to the central tabulator. We need to beef up procedures to mitigate risks.

Much of this information, originally published on July 8, 2003, has since been corroborated by formal studies (RABA) and by Diebold’s own internal memos written by its programmers.

more from [url=http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78]Black Box Vooting[/url] and [url=http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/376818]BugTraq[/url]